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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No. 890130-CA 
v. : 
1:1 ARR" JAMAR GORDAN, : Priority 2 
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held on November 2, 1988, Circuit Court Judge Sheila McCleve 
bound defendant over for trial on December 1, 1988 (R. 2, 9). 
Defendant was arraigned on December 9, 1988 before District Court 
Judge Frank G. Noel and the case was set for trial on February 1, 
1989 (R. 57, 172). 
On December 19, 1988, defendant moved in the district 
court to quash the circuit court bindover order on the grounds 
that the evidence was insufficient to establish probable cause 
that defendant committed the crimes (R. 58-63). In his 
memorandum he noted that a transcript of the preliminary hearing 
had been ordered for the district court's review (R. 61). On 
February 23, 1989, Judge Noel denied the motion, stating that the 
district court lacked jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of 
the evidence presented at preliminary hearing (R. 99). 
On March 8, 1989, defendant petitioned this Court for 
permission to file an interlocutory appeal (R. 104-09). This 
Court granted interlocutory review on April 13, 1989 (R. 103). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
There are no additional facts other than those set 
forth in the Statement of the Case, above. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district courts do not have jurisdiction to review 
the evidence supporting the bindover orders of circuit courts. 
The statute previously providing the district courts with 
appellate and supervisory authority over the circuit courts was 
amended in 1986 and the authority was eliminated. Defendant 
should have filed an interlocutory appeal petition in this Court 
directly from the circuit court order rather than filing a motion 
to quash in the district court if he wished appellate review of 
the bindover order. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURTS LACK JURISDICTION TO 
REVIEW THE ORDERS OF CIRCUIT COURTS. 
Defendant characterized his action in the district 
court as a motion to quash the bindover order. He argues that he 
was not seeking appellate review in the district court. 
Nonetheless, regardless of defendant's characterization, what 
defendant sought was review on the record from the circuit court 
of the sufficiency of the evidence presented to that court. He 
requested the district court to reverse the order of the circuit 
court based upon that review. See Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Quash the Bindover at R. 61. This type of on-the-
record review of the sufficiency of the evidence with the 
requested relief being reversal of the order reviewed can be 
nothing other than appellate review. The district court ruled 
that it lacked authority to review bindover orders of the circuit 
court and denied the motion to quash. This ruling was correct. 
Article VIII, section 5 of the Utah Constitution 
states: "The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as 
provided by statute." This provision was adopted in 1985 and 
markedly contrasts with its 1896 predecessor, which provided that 
a district court has "appellate jurisdiction from all inferior 
courts and tribunals, and supervisory control of the same." 
Prior to 1986, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) provided: 
The district court shall have original 
jurisdiction in all matters civil and 
criminal, not excepted in the Constitution 
and not prohibited by law; appellate 
jurisdiction from all inferior courts and 
tribunals, and a supervisory control of the 
same. 
See 1986 Utah Laws ch. 47, § 50. In 1986, the jurisdiction of 
the district court was redefined in Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 
(Supp. 1989). Subsection (1) states: "The district court has 
original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal . . 
The only reference to appellate jurisdiction is in subsection 
(5): "The district court has jurisdiction to review agency 
adjudicative proceedings as set forth in Chapter 46b, Title 63 . 
. .." Thus, the district court has no authority to review the 
orders of a circuit court under the only statute granting it 
appellate authority. This Court is vested with jurisdiction to 
review the orders of circuit courts in Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(d) (Supp. 1989). Accordingly, if defendant wished review of 
the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the preliminary 
hearing, he should have filed a timely interlocutory appeal from 
the circuit court order. State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 270 
(Utah 1985). As the Supreme Court held in Schreuder, Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(c) (Supp. 1989) governs appeals from bindover 
orders of circuit courts and grants a defendant the right to 
petition for an interlocutory appeal from the order. 
Defendant cites State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 
1986), for the proposition that the district court has 
jurisdiction to review bindover orders of the circuit court. 
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Defendant fails to note that the amendment of the statute 
previously granting the district court appellate jurisdiction 
over circuit courts, which limits its appellate jurisdiction to 
agency adjudicative proceedings, occurred in 1986, The amendment 
was effective July 1, 1986. 1986 Utah Laws ch. 47, § 82. 
Brickey was decided on January 24, 1986, nearly 6 months prior to 
the effective date of the amendment. At that time, the statute 
governing the district court's appellate jurisdiction did allow 
the district court to exercise supervisory and appellate 
authority over the circuit courts. See 1986 Utah Laws Ch. 47 § 
50. The statute no longer vests such authority in the district 
court and Brickey no longer applies. To the extent that this 
Court's statement in State v. Martinez, Case No. 860255-CA, slip 
op. at 3 (Utah Ct. App. filed Feb. 18, 1988), that Brickey 
recognizes an appellate authority in the district court is 
inconsistent with the district court's current statutory 
authority, it should not be followed. 
Defendant asserts that the district court has original 
jurisdiction to hear the motion to quash a circuit court bindover 
order. Thus, he contends that the district court could review 
the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the preliminary 
hearing. This assertion relies upon defendant's 
It is unclear what precedential value is attributed 
to unpublished opinions, thus, the use of the phrase "should not 
be followed." If this Court believes that it would be more 
appropriate to overrule Martinez on this point, then the State 
requests the Court to do so. 
mischaracterization of the review he sought as something other 
than appellate review. As stated more fully above, what 
defendant sought from the district court was review of the 
circuit court record and a determination by the district court 
that the record was insufficient to support the order. This is 
nothing other than appellate review. Section 78-3-4 and art. 
VIII, § 5 both speak of original jurisdiction and appellate 
jurisdiction as separate classes of jurisdiction. Original 
jurisdiction is the authority of a court to hear matters 
originally filed in that court, Appellate jurisdiction is the 
authority of a court to review orders of other tribunals. By 
simply characterizing his motion as an original action in the 
district court, defendant cannot transform appellate review into 
something that is included in the district court's original 
jurisdictional authority. If this were possible, anyone could 
characterize anything in a way in which they could obtain a 
hearing in the court of their choice rather than in the court 
that is designated to hear the matter. C!f. DeBry v„ Salt Lake 
County Board of Appeals, 764 P.2d 627 (Utah Ct. App« 
1988)(constitutional grant of general appellate jurisdiction does 
not grant specific appellate jurisdiction where there is no 
statutory appellate authority over the tribunal appealed from). 
Defendant also refers to Utah R. Crim. P. 12 for the 
district court's authority to quash bindovers. Defendant 
correctly states that the district court can dismiss a criminal 
action where there are defects in the indictment or information; 
however, he reads too much into the Rule 12 provision. Rule 12 
states: 
(b) Any defense, objection or request, 
including request for rulings on the 
admissibility of evidence, which is capable 
of determination without the trial of the 
general issue may be raised prior to trial by 
written motion. The following shall be 
raised at least five days prior to the trial: 
(1) Defenses and objections based on defects 
in the indictment or information other than 
that it fails to show jurisdiction in the 
court or to charge an offense, which 
objection shall be noticed by the court at 
any time during the pendency of the 
proceeding; . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-12(b)(1) (1982, repealed effective July 1, 
1990). Defendant's reliance on this rule is misplaced because he 
was not objecting to any defects in the information. Rather, he 
objected to the order of the circuit court binding him over for 
trial. Rule 12(b)(1) governs objections to the information 
itself and not objections to an order of the circuit court. The 
rule does not create an appellate authority in the district court 
that otherwise does not exist. 
In Point II of his brief, defendant argues that this 
Court should place appellate review of bindover orders in the 
hands of the district court in the interest of judicial economy. 
Not only are defendant's arguments weak, but they encourage this 
Court to make a policy decision that may only be made by the 
Legislature. 
Defendant asserts that the district court could more 
quickly dispose of the issue of whether a bindover was supported 
by sufficient evidence than could this Court. He asserts that 
Rule 12 governs such a review and that he is required to raise 
the issue at least five days prior to trial. He argues, 
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therefore, that the district court would necessarily decide the 
issue during the five days prior to trial and that this process 
would be much faster than interlocutory review. 
There are several flaws in defendant's scheme of 
review. First, defendant's assertion that the district court 
would review the case much more quickly is not necessarily 
accurate. Defendant's review scheme is attached to the trial 
date — a date that, for many reasons, may be continued 
repeatedly. A criminal trial is rarely set so soon after a 
bindover that a motion to quash based upon insufficient evidence 
would be disposed of sooner than this Court could hear an 
interlocutory appeal. Under defendant's scheme, a defendant's 
motion to quash could be filed five days prior to trial even if 
the trial date was not scheduled until several months after the 
preliminary hearing and bindover. 
Further, by filing his request for review as a motion 
to quash in the district court, defendant creates for himself the 
ability to file an interlocutory appeal petition from an adverse 
ruling of the district court. Instead of creating a more 
efficient system of review, defendant creates a system in which 
he hopes to obtain two separate reviews of the same issue. 
A timely interlocutory appeal petition, on the other 
hand, is attached to the order appealed from. A petition for 
permission to appeal must be filed within 20 days from the order 
appealed from. See State v. Tiffany, Case no. 890595-CA (order 
filed Jan. 4, 1990). This date is much more predictable than one 
which is tied to an uncertain trial date which is dependant upon 
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court scheduling and any other proceedings that might be required 
prior to trialf such as competency evaluations, motions to 
suppress evidence, etc. 
Second, defendant assumes that the district court could 
review the record of the preliminary hearing during the five days 
prior to trial. This assumption is unrealistic and is certainly 
not borne out by the facts of this case. Because the district 
court's primary function is to hear trials, it would be required 
to fit the review of a bindover order into its already 
overcrowded trial schedule. The court might be required to read 
several volumes of transcript from the preliminary hearing to 
properly evaluate a defendant's claim of insufficient evidence. 
In fact, defendant here requested the court to review the 
transcript of the preliminary hearing (R. 61). Such a review 
requires time, thus, a five-day expectation is impractical. 
Third, defendant asserts that this Court's review 
process would be even further delayed because this Court must 
determine whether to accept the appeal and then the case would 
follow the normal schedule for preparation of transcripts and 
briefing which he asserts is too lengthy. This problem, if it 
exists, is easily rectified. This Court could treat criminal 
interlocutory appeals with expedition and could require the 
parties to adhere to an expedited briefing schedule. This Court 
need not grant extensions for preparation of briefs. 
Moreover, defendant cannot seriously be suggesting that 
the preparation of transcripts for this Court's review would 
require any more time than would the preparation of transcripts 
_Q_ 
for the district court's review. Nor can he seriously be 
suggesting that a district court could review the sufficiency of 
the evidence presented to another court without reviewing the 
record that was created in that court. This Court's primary 
function is appellate review of the records created in lower 
courts. This Court is well-equipped to perform that function. 
There is no need for a criminal trial to be delayed by this Court 
any longer than it would be delayed by the district court for 
consideration of the same issue. 
Even though defendant asserts that this Court is unable 
to review the bindover order as skillfully as the district court, 
this Court is well-equipped to review the sufficiency of the 
evidence that has been presented to a lower tribunal. Indeed, 
this Court is frequently called upon to review the sufficiency of 
the evidence in criminal cases. Defendant's assertion that the 
trial court is better able to review fact intensive issues misses 
the mark because this assertion would only be valid if the 
district court heard additional evidence. Of course, neither the 
State nor the defendant could claim that a circuit court order 
should stand or fall based upon evidence that was not presented 
to the circuit court. Thus, defendant's argument is baseless. 
Finally, even if this Court thought that policy 
considerations dictated that the district court is the 
appropriate forum for appellate review of circuit court bindover 
orders, this Court has no authority to place jurisdiction in the 
district court. Article VIII, § 5 authorizes the district courts 
to exercise appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. There 
is no statutory authority for district courts to review the 
orders of circuit courts. For this reason, the district court 
correctly denied defendant's motion to quash the bindover order, 
and this Court should affirm the district court's order. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to affirm the district court's order denying defendant's motion 
to quash the circuit court order binding him over for trial. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 3/ day of January, 
1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
?*##*/ 
"SANDRA L. SJOGREN1 
Assistant Attorney General 
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